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Abstract
Humeanism about laws of nature is, roughly, the view that the laws of nature are
just patterns, or ways of describing patterns, in the mosaic of events.
In this paper I survey some of the (many!) objections that have been raised to
Humeanism, considering how the Humean might respond. And I consider how we
might make a positive case for Humeanism. The common thread running through all
this is that the viability of the Humean view relies on the Humean having an impor-
tantly different conception of explanation to the anti-Humean.
Humeanism, as that term is typically understood in modern metaphysics and the philosophy
of science, is the idea that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences.
Facts about redness can be necessarily connected to facts about scarletness, because redness
and scarletness are not distinct existences. Similarly facts about a whole can be necessarily
connected to facts about it’s parts, because they are not distinct. But two wholly distinct
existences cannot be necessarily connected.
*Thanks to Nina Emery, Mike Hicks, Tyler Hildebrand, Elizabeth Miller and Erica Shumener for very
helpful comments on previous drafts.
2Humeanism about laws of nature is an approach to scientific laws which denies that laws
imply necessary connections between distinct existences. Roughly, the idea is that laws of
nature reduce to the patterns of occurrent, non-modal, events that occur in the world. The
laws of nature are just patterns, or ways of describing patterns, in the mosaic of events. So,
there is no problem with necessary connections between the laws and particular events, since
the laws and the particular events are not distinct existences.
(Candidate laws of nature are things like Schrödinger’s equation, or the law of conservation
of energy. Whether there are laws of nature about higher-level sciences, like biology or
economics, is an interesting question that we will put aside.)
The Humean view stands in opposition to anti-Humean views which typically claim that
laws are over and above the patterns of events and, in fact, that the laws govern those events,
rather than merely describing them. (Although not all anti-Humean approaches think of
laws as this separate, governing entity. SeeHildebrand (2020) for an excellent survey of
anti-Humean approaches.)
To be more precise, Humeanism about laws of nature is the view that the laws of nature
reduce to the Humean Mosaic — that is, the intrinsic physical state of each spacetime point
(or each pointlike object) and the spatio-temporal relations between those points — and
that the Humean Mosaic is not further reduced to anything else.1
(From this point on I’m going to use ‘Humeanism’ to refer to Humeanism about laws of
nature and not the more general denial of necessary connections.)
In principle there are many different possible ways that this reduction of the laws to the
Humean mosaic could go, but in practice there is one dominant Humean approach — the
1This formulation is from Bhogal (fort), it’s closely related to those given by Maudlin (2007, p. 51-52)
and Lewis (1986, p. x).
3Best System Account (BSA). The core idea of the BSA is that the laws are the axioms of a
system that best balances simplicity and informativeness. A system is simple if its axioms
are simple. A system is informative if it tells us a lot about the mosaic.
There is huge amount more to say about the details of the BSA. How exactly do we define
simplicity and informativeness? Does there need to be some restrictions on the language
that axioms are formulated in? How do we balance simplicity and informativeness? Are
there any other virtues of systems that are relevant to which is best? And so on. Many
variants of the BSA have been proposed.2
These issues deserve their own article. In this article I’ll be putting aside these issues with
the BSA to focus on more general issues to do with Humeanism, but I will assume that some
version of the BSA is the correct Humean story.
My focus in this article will be different. Humeanism faces a lot of powerful objections.
Many of which threaten to be fatal. (And I say this as a committed Humean, by the way.)
I’m going to consider some of these objections. It turns out that it’s not at all easy for
the Humean to respond. But, I’ll suggest, if the Humean has a clear conception of how
explanation works on their view – that is of how Humean laws can explain particular facts
– then this could point the way to responses. I’ll end by considering some issues about the
positive case for Humeanism – even if Humeanism can be defended from the objections,
why should we believe it?
2E.g. Hicks (2018), Dorst (2019b), Jaag and Loew (fort), Hall (2012), Bhogal and Perry (2017), Loewer
(2012), Cohen and Callender (2009), Braddon-Mitchell (2001), Schrenk (2006) etc.. In fact, the BSA ma-
chinery can be used by non-Humeans too. Humean BSAs reduce the laws to the Humean mosaic, which does
not contain any necessary connections. But,Demarest (2017) uses the BSA to reduce the laws to a base which
does include necessary connections.
41 The Case against Humeanism
I’ll consider four objections to Humeanism. One important objection that I will not con-
sider is the objection that Humeanism is in tension with the non-local ‘entanglement’ phe-
nomenon of quantum mechanics. These issues have already been discussed in detail in
Philosophy Compass (Miller, 2016; Chen, 2019).
1.1 Explanatory Circularity
Perhaps the most common objection to Humeanism in recent years is that it leads to a kind
of explanatory circularity. The objection goes like this: Laws have an important role in
explanation— they are part of what explain specific events. For example, if one billiard ball
hits a second the physical laws are part of what explains why the second billiard ball moved.
But, on the Humean view, the laws are explained by the patterns of events – via the BSA.
So it looks like the laws (partially) explain the particular events, which in turn explain the
laws – an unacceptable circularity.
A complex dialectic flows from this objection – let’s trace one strand of it.
Step 1: We can respond to the circularity objection by distinguishing between two types of
explanation—metaphysical and scientific. We can then claim that Humean laws scientifically
explain particular events in the Humean mosaic while they are metaphysically explained by
the mosaic. So, there isn’t any problematic circularity — what initially looked like circular
explanation is just two different explanatory relations running in different directions. This
is the suggestion of Loewer (2012).
(Exactly how to distinguish metaphysical from scientific explanations is not wholly clear.
Roughly speaking, metaphysical explanations are closely related to, or ‘backed’ by, ground-
5ing, constitution, or other ‘building’ relations. Scientific explanations typically don’t have
such features. The issue is not simple though because, as we will see imminently, ground-
ing or constitution-based explanations do seem to have roles to play in science.)
Step 2: Lange (2013) argues that there is a ‘transitivity principle’ connecting scientific and
metaphysical explanation: If A (partially) metaphysically explains B and B (partially) scien-
tifically explains C then A (partially) scientifically explains C. He claims that this principle
is suggested by scientific practice. Consider, for example, a Newtonian explanation where
facts about the mass distribution of an object explain facts about its center of mass, and
then the facts about the center of mass explain why that object tipped over. This is a scien-
tific explanation that consists in chaining together a metaphysical explanation of the object’s
center of mass with a scientific explanation of the why the object tipped over. Lange claims
that in general we can chain scientific and metaphysical explanations in this way.
If the transitivity principle is true, then Loewer’s response to the circularity objection doesn’t
work. The claim that the laws are metaphysically explained by the mosaic, while events that
make up the mosaic are scientifically explained by the laws implies, given the transitivity
principle, that mosaic scientifically explains the events that make up the mosaic. And con-
sequently, particular events in the mosaic partially scientifically explain themselves. This
seems unacceptable.
Step 3: Some philosophers, e.g. Hicks and van Elswyk (2015), Miller (2015) and Marshall
(2015), argue, in response to Lange, that the transitivity condition is false. They present a
series of counterexamples, but perhaps the most compelling ones come from cases of mul-
tiple realizability. Imagine that A (partially) metaphysically explains B, and B scientifically
explains C. However, A is not necessary for B. Rather, B could have been metaphysically
explained in many other ways. In some such cases it seems like A doesn’t make a difference
6to the occurrence of C, and so A isn’t explanatorily relevant to C.
For example, Miller (p. 1322) considers a case where a particular particle in a room having a
certain kinetic energy partially metaphysically explains the temperature in the room. And in
turn the temperature in the room partially scientifically explains why a drop of condensation
ran down a glass with velocity v. But the kinetic energy of the particle is not a difference-
maker for the velocity of the condensation, and so it not explanatorily relevant.
Step 4: Even assuming that such cases are counterexamples to the transitivity principle
(though Lange (2018) denies this), there clearly are some cases where we can chain together
scientific and metaphysical explanations to form a bigger scientific explanation. So, the
Humean needs some story about why chaining occurs in some cases, but not in the cases
that cause a problem for the Humean response to the circularity objection. Dorst (2019a)
and Bhogal (fort) both claim that the key is for the Humean to identify the differing aims
of scientific and metaphysical explanation. Bhogal claims that scientific explanations are
distinctively unificatory, so metaphysical explanations can chain with scientific explanations
only in the cases where the metaphysical explanations contribute to unification. Dorst has
a similar approach but instead of unification he focuses on the pragmatic role of scientific
explanation and the way it ‘increase[s] the predictive utility of our scientific theories’.
So the explanatory circularity objection has pushed Humeans towards much bigger claims
about the nature of explanation and how the projects of scientific and metaphysical inves-
tigation relate.
This is only one strand of the dialectic, but hopefully it gives the reader a feel for the issues.
The initial circularity objection could be approached in completely different ways too. The
approach we have been considering distinguishes the way in which the laws explain the
events making up the mosaic from the way in which those events explain the laws. But you
7could also just deny one of these explanations.
For example, Hicks (fort) (following Ruben (1990) and Skow (2016)) simply denies that
laws explain particular events. Rather, laws ‘back’ scientific explanations of particular events.
This removes the initial circularity but there’s a concern that the view still accepts something
worryingly close to explanatory circularity— that laws are explained by the mosaic and laws
‘back’ explanations of the mosaic (see Lange (2018, section 4)).
And Miller (2015, section 3), Marshall (2015) and Kovacs (2020) suggest that we can re-
spond by simply denying that the laws are metaphysically explained by the mosaic. This
certainly avoids the circularity, but it’s a difficult question whether the resulting view really
counts as Humean and would be satisfying to those with Humean inclinations. The strategy
is deny the laws are metaphysically explained by the mosaic but to accept that the laws super-
vene on the mosaic. Whether this really counts as a Humean view gets at some much bigger
questions about how to formulate metaphysical theses, and in particular whether modality
is the right tool in formulating them. (See Bhogal (2017, section 4) for a discussion of
different ways to formulate Humeanism.)
1.2 Non-Supervenience
Another classic objection to Humeanism is that it implies that the laws supervene on the
mosaic, but this seems to be false — there seem to be possible situations, taken seriously
in scientific practice, where the mosaic can be the same but the laws can differ. Tooley
(1977, p. 669), Carroll (1994, pp. 57-67) and Maudlin (2007, pp. 67-68) give commonly
discussed examples, but here’s a very simple case: Take a mosaic M which only contains
one particle moving inertially though spacetime. This mosaic is consistent with the laws of
Newtonian mechanics. So, it seems like there would be a world with this mosaic where the
8laws are Newtonian. But the mosaic is also consistent with it being a law that everything
always moves inertially. So, it seems like there could be a world with this mosaic where a
law is that everything moves inertially. But now it seems like there are two possible worlds
where the mosaic is the same but the laws are different. So supervenience is false.
Humeans have had surprising little to say about cases like this. The most common response
is to say that one, or both, of the worlds described above are in fact metaphysically impos-
sible. More generally they accept that their view goes against our intuitions about what
worlds are possible. (See Earman and Roberts (2005, section 2), Loewer (1996, pp.192-
194), Roberts (1998, p. 428-433), Beebee (2000, sections 5-6) etc..)
Roberts (2008, pp. 358-361) and Bhogal (fort, section 2.3) have more substantial responses
though. Roberts claims that the world with mosaic M where the laws are Newtonian and
the world with mosaic M where the law is that particles always move inertially both exist
and the are the same world. This is because he has a non-standard conception of law where
claims about a particular law holding in a possible world are context sensitive.3 So, there
is only one world which has mosaic M, but in some contexts it’s true that the laws of that
world are Newtonian and in other contexts it’s true that the laws of that world include the
proposition that everything always moves inertially.
Bhogal claims that the we can extend Loewer’s distinction between scientific and metaphys-
ical explanation to a distinction between metaphysical and scientific possibility.4 In particu-
lar, he thinks that there is good reason for the Humean to accept that there is an important
space of possibility that outruns metaphysical possibility— the space of scientific possibility
contains worlds that are not metaphysically possible. The central thought is that the expla-
3Carroll (2018) develops Roberts’s approach, giving a different account of how the context sensitivity
works.
4He actually uses the term ‘nomothetic’ rather than ‘scientific’.
9nation of the laws in terms of the mosaic is a metaphysical explanation but is not relevant
for scientific practice — and so that explanation constrains the space of metaphysical pos-
sibility but not scientific possibility. As a result, he claims that both the mosaic M worlds
are scientifically possible, even though at least one has to be metaphysically impossible.
Both of these responses are somewhat complicated. But they share an idea: That the
Humean needs to, in some way or other, loosen the modal connection between the laws
and the mosaic. They need to allow that there are, in some sense, possibilities where the
laws can vary independently of the the mosaic. However, in order for the view to remain
distinctively Humean, this modal claim needs to be made consistent with the claim that the
laws are reduced to the mosaic. Roberts does this by making the reduction of the laws to
the mosaic context sensitive. Bhogal does this by distinguishing between multiple spaces of
possibility. Perhaps there are other potential strategies too. But the challenge is to loosen
the the modal connection in a way that’s well motivated and consistent with Humeanism.
1.3 The Regularity of the World, and Induction
This section is actually about two, very closely related, objections which have had surpris-
ingly little attention in recent years.
Here’s the first objection. Given the Humean view that there are no necessary connections
between distinct existences the fact that the world is relatively regular and orderly seems
like a complete fluke — a gigantic coincidence. If every event in the Humean mosaic is
disconnected then it’s incredibly surprising that those events would form regular patterns.
(Strawson, 1989, p. 24) makes this case using an analogy:
[Imagine that] a true randomizing device determines the colour value of each
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pixel on a standard 800 × 400 computer screen, running on a ten-times-a-
second cycle – so that each pixel can take any colour value for each 1/10th
second period. On the screen it appears that there is a film showing. A woman
enters a house, walks over to a stove, and puts on a kettle. Life – a world, as
it were – goes on in an ordered, regular fashion, exactly as regularly as in our
own world. But the image is being generated by the true randomizing device.
It is pure fluke that what happens on the screen appears to tell a coherent story
of a regular, ordered world, rather than filling up with – or suddenly switching
to – a fizz of points of colour.
This, Strawson thinks, is analogous to the Humean picture of the world. If each event in
the Humean mosaic is a disconnected pixel, so to speak, then we should expect the world to
consist in random chaos. It’s a massive coincidence that we, in fact, see order in the world.
The second objection is closely related: If it’s just a fluke that the world we have observed has
been ordered and regular then it seems that we are not justified in thinking that the world
will continued to be ordered in the future. So, we are not justified in making inferences
from what has happened in the past to what will happen in the future. And so, Humeanism
leads to inductive skepticism.
These two objections could be developed in a couple of different ways. Firstly, via prob-
abilistic considerations: The regularity of the world is a fluke for the Humean because, if
we count up the possible Humean mosaics, there are many more Humean mosaics that
are chaotic than ones which are regular (e.g. Foster (1982), Hildebrand (2013), Filomeno
(ming)). Secondly, via explanatory considerations: The regularity of the world is a fluke for
the Humean because there is no explanation of the regularity (e.g. Emery (2019)).
The explanatory versions of the problems are, I think, more forceful than the probabilistic
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versions. In response to the claim that there are more chaotic Humean mosaics than regular
ones the Humean could reasonably respond that this is no special problem for them — if
anti-Humean laws can be arbitrarily complicated then there are more chaotic anti-Humean
worlds than there are regular ones. (Although, whether this Humean response works may
depend upon the exact version of anti-Humeanism they are targeting, see Hildebrand (2013,
fort).)
This doesn’t defuse the explanatory versions of the objection though. It’s still the case that
there seems to be no explanation of the regularity of the world for the Humean— it’s merely
a coincidence — and that this seems to undermine inductive inferences.
What responses can the Humean give here? Here are three possible options:
(1) The Humean could accept that they have a problem here but to claim that the anti-
Humean has a problem too. Beebee (2011) makes this case with respect to induction. She
accepts that the Humean position has a problem with induction, but suggests that every-
one has a problem with induction. However, whether or not Beebee really shows that the
Humean and the anti-Humean are really in an equal position with respect to induction, it’s
hard to see how this can help with the concern that the Humean can’t explain the regularity
of the world.
(2) Another option is for the Humean to say that they do, in fact, have an explanation of
the regularity. It’s somewhat hard to see what this explanation could be though. Perhaps
the most natural suggestion is that the Humean laws explain the regularity of the world.
So, for example, if it happened to be the case that the best system of the world outputted
Newtonian laws, like F=MA, then those laws would explain the regularity of the world just
like they would, according to the Humean, explain all sorts of other facts about the mosaic.
But something seems very unsatisfying about the prospect of explaining the regularity of
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the mosaic by appealing to Humean laws which are themselves derived from the mosaic.
And the concern here isn’t just the circularity concern described in section 1.1, rather it’s
something deeper.
One way to put the concern is that explanations seem to give us some important epistemic
benefit — explanations help us to understand the phenomenon in question. But, how could
the Humean law that F=MA — that F=MA is part of the best system for summarizing the
mosaic in a simple and informative way — possibly help us understand why the mosaic is
regular? How does citing the output of the BSA give us any epistemic benefit in investigating
why the mosaic is regular in the first place? Let’s come back to these issues more in the next
subsection.
(3) A third option is for the Humean to accept that they cannot explain the regularity of
the world, but to somehow argue that this is acceptable — that the regularity of the mosaic
is appropriately unexplained. And the regularity being appropriately unexplained, somehow,
helps make sense of why it’s reasonable to expect the regularity to continue and so reasonable
to perform inductions.5
This, I suspect, is the best path forward for the Humean, but it’s not at all easy to see how
it could be developed properly. What would be needed is some story about why it is ok for
the Humean to not explain certain facts about the mosaic. This story would have to flow
from a more general understanding of when facts need explaining and when they do not —
a understanding of when it is appropriate for theories to take certain facts as explanatorily
basic and when those facts must be explained. I’ll come back to this issue briefly in the next
section.
In fact, all of these options seem extremely difficult for the Humean to properly develop,
5Hicks (fort, section 3.2) suggests an approach of roughly this kind, though in the context of responding
to a slightly different objection than the one we are considering.
13
but if some such response isn’t developed then the objection that the regularity of the world
is just an incredible coincidence looks to be fatal for Humeanism.
1.4 What is Humean Explanation?
A lot of the discussion so far points towards a very deep problem for the Humean — one
that is rarely addressed head on in the literature: It’s extremely unclear what the Humean
conception of explanation is.
Thismay initially seem puzzling. Can’t theHumean just look at the literature on explanation
and pick out whatever their favorite theory of explanation is? After all, there are many
options to choose from.
Just for simplicity, imagine that the Humean favored some kind of covering-law approach
to explanation — on this view we explain an event by showing how it follows from the laws
and certain background conditions.6 Why is it then unclear what the Humean conception
of explanation is?
Strevens (2008, section 1.23) distinguishes between two elements that any good theory of
explanation have. A good theory has to specify formal criteria which explanations have to
meet in order to really count as explanation. He calls this the formal requirement. But, in
addition, good theories have to specify the ‘The relation between explanation and explanan-
dum that the account claims gives an explanation its force’. He calls this the explanatory
relation. Another way to get at (roughly) the same issue is to ask what it is about the expla-
nation that makes sense of why the explanandum holds? How does the explanans allow us
to understand the explanandum?
6Of course, more has to be said here for the view to avoid classic problems with the D-N account of
explanation. But that’s not important now.
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The problem is that the Humean can search the literature on explanation and pick their fa-
vorite account of the formal requirement, but the associated explanatory relation might well
look very different when the account is integrated with the Humean metaphysical picture.
For example, when an anti-Humean accepts the covering-law account of explanation it’s
natural for them to suggest that what gives such explanations their force is the way that the
explanandum depends upon the explanans. On a typical anti-Humean view the law governs
particular events, making those events happen. The anti-Humean can say that the force of
covering-law explanations come from tracking these real nomic dependence relations that
exist in the world.
But theHumean does not think that there are real nomic dependence relations. They cannot
say that the force of explanations comes from the way that the laws govern the events. Rather,
they need some other story about the force of those explanations. This issue is surprisingly
underexplored in the literature. The Humean needs a clear story about the force and value
of scientific explanations. If they don’t have that then the Humean has an inadequate picture
of how science works.
The Humean response that I favor here is, in a sense, a very natural one. The basic idea
was suggested briefly by Loewer (1996, p. 197) and Miller (2015, p. 1326) — the force of
Humean explanation should derive from unification. When we explain a particular event
by appealing to a Humean law what we are doing is showing how this particular event fits
into a more general pattern in the mosaic — we are unifying this event with other events in
the mosaic.
This appeal to unification does, I think, help the Humean with some of the objections that
we have considered. As I mentioned in the section on explanatory circularity, the appeal to
unification can help us draw the distinction betweenmetaphysical and scientific explanation
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— the aim of scientific explanation is unification, not so for metaphysical explanation —
and so it can make sense of when scientific and metaphysical explanations chain and when
they do not (Bhogal, fort). Further, as I mentioned in the section on the non-supervenience
objection, once we have properly drawn this distinction in explanation it’s plausible that we
can extend this to a distinction between scientific and metaphysical possibility, giving us
tools to deal with the non-supervenience objection.
And further, it’s possible that the appeal to unification will help make sense of why certain
general facts about the mosaic are legitimately unexplained for the Humean. After all, if
the force of explanation comes from fitting particular events into more general patterns, in
order to unify the event in question with other events, then it’s natural to think that the
most general patterns in the mosaic must be unexplained. So, perhaps we could argue that
the unificationist conception of explanation motivates the appropriateness of taking these
general patterns as unexplained.
So, developing a unificationist approach to Humean explanation is, I think, very promising.
But, the details of the unificationist approach to explanation are sparse. Friedman (1974)
and Kitcher (1981) influentially developed the initial versions of unificationist approach,
but subsequently, the view has dropped in popularity and so hasn’t been filled out in the
way that one would hope. It remains rather impressionistic. If the Humean wants to appeal
to unification, as I think they should, there is a lot of work to do.
2 The Positive Case
As I noted earlier, most of the literature on Humeanism consists in developing the view and
responding to the variety of objections that it faces. There is less work on motivating the
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view. Part of the reason for this, I suspect, is that many people find the Humean view ob-
viously attractive. The basic picture that Humeanism gives us, where the world consists of
events just pushed up against each other in spacetime, is very compelling to those philoso-
phers who like desert landscapes and sparse ontology. The implicit thought among many
is that if the Humean view is defensible then its clear attractions should lead us to accept it.
But, if we try to go further than this in developing a positive reason to be Humean, then we
start to see that things are not simple.
In particular, the most natural motivation for Humeanism comes from general empiricist
ideas. The basic thought is that anti-Humean laws, if they were to exist, would be unde-
tectable. And that’s a reason to believe that they don’t exist.
In slightly more detail, the thought is that there is some set of evidence that we have in
a privileged way via our experience; there is certain evidence that we have directly, or non-
inferentially. And anti-Humean laws are underdetermined by this data. After all, the experi-
ences that we have are consistent with many different sets of anti-Humean laws, and indeed,
with the lack of anti-Humean laws (Earman (1984)). One way to put the point, very much
in the spirit of Hume himself, is that it seems like we only directly experience parts of the
Humean mosaic — we do not directly experience the necessary connections that may or
may not be there. Further, the anti-Humean laws are underdetermined by the Humean
mosaic, so they are underdetermined by our experience. And, the thought continues, the
anti-Humean laws being underdetermined by our direct evidence is reason to suspicious of
their existence.
As Maudlin (2007, Chapter 2) argues, the concern with this kind of empiricist reasoning is
that it seems to overgeneralize. Very similar considerations can be raised against the existence
of entities that are simply too small to be directly observed, like electrons, and in favor of
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views where entities like electrons don’t exist, but the observable world just looks as if they
do. And in fact, we can run similar empiricist arguments for even more general anti-realist
positions. When we start on the train of empiricist reasoning is hard to see how to get it to
stop.
The most obvious way of getting the empiricist train to stop is via explanatory considera-
tions. We have to commit to the existence of electrons in order to explain what we directly
observe. This seems like a very promising approach. But of course, it’s natural for the anti-
Humean to say the same thing about laws—we have to appeal to anti-Humean laws in order
to explain what we observe. In order to explain, for example, the regularity of the world.
So the Humean must resist the idea that anti-Humean laws are essential for explaining facts
about the mosaic while accepting that electrons, for example, are essential explainers. Once
again the issue comes down how the nature of explanation differs for the Humean and the
anti-Humean.
This empiricism is not the only possible motivation for Humeanism of course. One com-
mon motivation comes from the way that the defender of the BSA claims that their view
mirrors scientific practice (e.g. Demarest, 2017). The BSA sticks very closely to the ac-
tual practice of science — in fact, one way to describe the view is that it takes the actual
methodology of science and it mirrors that methodology in the account of the metaphysics
of laws. Hall (2012) calls this the ‘unofficial guiding idea’ behind Humeanism about laws.
Perhaps this mirroring of science favors the Humean view. But the concerns expressed in the
sections on explanatory circularity and non-supervenience suggest that the Humean view
in fact diverges significantly from the claims of explanation and possibility that we see in
scientific practice. It’s not clear, then whether it is the Humean or the anti-Humean that
properly respects scientific practice.
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Maybe the most common motivation for Humeanism that you hear in person is that there
is just something very strange about anti-Humean laws that govern particular events. What
even is governing? It is true that the anti-Humean should say more than they tradition-
ally have about the nature of concepts like governing.7 But clearly, such a motivation
for Humeanism isn’t dialectically effective against anti-Humeans who don’t find anything
strange in governing laws.
Of course, this isn’t a comprehensive survey of the possible motivations for Humeanism.
But we can see that it’s not especially clear how to best motivate the Humean view.
3 Conclusion
The Humean view of laws faces many difficulties. So many, in fact, that the view might
start to seem untenable. But these difficulties are not independent. For example, although
it may not seem it initially, the Humean problem with explanatory circularity is related
to the problem with inductive skepticism – they are both driven by considerations of how
explanation works for the Humean. Consequently, the Humean does have the potential to
deal with all these problems. In particular, if Humean can develop a clear conception of the
nature of explanation, then that can go a very long way to defending and motivating their
view.
7Though Wilsch (fort) and in progress work by Perry (ms), Shumener (ms), and Emery (ms) shows that
some anti-Humeans are taking on this challenge.
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